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Volume XIII JUNE, 1948 Number 3
APPOINTMENT OF SUCCESSOR TRUSTEES, TRUST
ADMINISTRATION AND SETTLEMENTS IN MISSOURI
LEE-CARL OVERSTREET*
In the event that a trustee who is named in a trust which has been
created either by deed or by will disclaims, resigns, dies, becomes unable,
or refuses, to act, the appointment of a successor trustee and the vesting
of title to the trust property in the successor trustee are matters which are
fundamental in the administration of any trust. Likewise, court supervision
of administration of the trust and the making of settlements by the trustee
are basic matters. Like many other fundamental or elementary matters,
the ones just mentioned are only too often slurred over by draftsmen and
practitioners alike, so that easily avoided difficulties are often presented to
courts for solution.
Much of what is to follow will be only a resum6 of matters which are well
known to careful draftsmen and practitioners in the field of trusts in Missouri.
It is felt, however, that a re-examination of the Missouri case and statutory
materials may clarify some of the aspects'of these matters or, at least,
indicate some pertinent problems and so be of value to the profession.
APPOINTMENT OF SUCCESSOR TRUSTEES
First of all, it should be noted that if a competent trustee is named,
either by deed or by will, that original trustee takes office by virtue of
being named as trustee in the instrument creating the trust and his appoint-
ment by a court of equity is not only unnecessary but is void.1 It is
*Professor of Law, University of Missouri. (In a moment of weakness, when
the date for delivery of this article to the editor was far in the future, the writer
committed himself to deliver on a named date. That date has arrived, but other
duties have pushed the proper preparation of the article into the background, so
that it has been all too hastily prepared to be properly fortified with all-inclusive
citations. If any readers should detect inaccuracies or omissions which their knowl-
edge exposes, the writer will be glad to have the benefit of their temperate com-
ments thereon.)
1. Riggs v. Moise, 344 Mo. 177, 128 S.W. 2d 632 (1939); State ex rel.
Riggs v. Seehorn, 344 Mo. 186, 125 S.W. 2d 851 (1939); Williams v. Hund, 302
Mo. 451, at 472, 258 S.W. 703 (1924).
(255)
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interesting to note that persons who have been named as trustees have
sought, and received, appointment as trustees in this state.2 Since the decision
of the supreme court in Riggs v. Moise,8 it is obvious that such a manner
of proceeding is futile.
If the creator of a trust, whether established by deed or will, provides
in the trust instrument for the appointment of a successor trustee in the
event of a vacancy in the office of trustee, such a provision will be effective
and will, when exercised, operate by way of a power of appointment, pro-
viding only that the individual or group designated to appoint the successor
trustee is competent so to act.4 It should be-noted that it has been held in
this state that although the individual members of a county court may
be properly designated to select a successor trustee, a county court, as
such, is incapable of appointing a. successor trustee and its selection of a
successor trustee is invalid, even though the settlor attempted to vest that
power in that court.5
It would seem that every draftsman of a trust instrument should be
careful to provide in that instrument for the appointment of successor
trustees. By so doing, he will, so far as is possible, insure that successors
will be appointed in the manner prescribed by him. It may even be that
the settlor will wish to designate named individuals as successors instead
of providing generally for the appointment of successor trustees in the mode
mentioned above.6 If the draftsman makes such provision, there is no
authority in any court to appoint a successor trustee, so long as the manner
of appointment specified in the trust instrument is complied with and com-
petent trustees are appointed.7
If the trust instrument contains no provision dealing with the matter
of appointment of successor trustees, or if the persons designated as sue-
2. State tx rel. Kenney v. Johnson, 229 Mo. App. 16, 68 S.W. 2d 858 (1934);
In re Beauchamp's Estate, 184 S.W. 2d 729 (Mo. App. 1945); Riggs v. Moise,
supra note 1.
3. Supra note 1.
4. Harwood v. Tracy, 118 Mo. 631, 24 S.W. 214 (1893); Adams v. High-
land Cemetery Co., 192 S.W. 944 (Mo. 1917); 1 ScoTr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS, § 108.3
(1939) (hereinafter, this text will be cited as "Sco-rr, TRuSTS"); 3, Part 1, BOGERT,
THE LAw oF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, § 532 (1946) (hereinafter, this text will be
cited as "BOGERT, TRUSTS").
5. Harwood v. Tracy, supra note 4.
6. Supra note 4.
7. Id. It should be noted that there must be a showing of the fact that the
successor trustee has been properly appointed, pursuant to the power, or else the
ability of the successor trustee may be successfully questioned, as was done in
Bumgarner v. Cogswell, 49 Mo. 259 (1872).
[Vol. 13
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cessors refuse to act, or if the persons designated to select successors do
not so select successors, the matter of appointment of a successor trustee
devolves upon the appropriate circuit court in this state, in the exercise of
its powers as a court of equity. It is elementary learning that a trust will
not fail for want of a trustee, so that in the development of their control
over the field of trusts, courts of equity from a very early time would appoint
successor trustees to fill vacancies in the office of trustee.8 It is still possible
to proceed in this manner in the state of Missouri today. Such a proceeding
for the appointment of a successor trustee, whether he is to act under a
deed or will, would be in the nature of the traditional equity in personam
suit and the old trustee, or his legal representatives, and the persons bene-
ficially interested in the trust should all be joined as parties., As a matter
of fact, if the trust instrument in question be testamentary in character, the
appointment of a successor trustee in the manner just mentioned is the
only way in which the persons, interested in the trust may properly secure
the appointment of a successor trustee because of the fact that no statute
has been passed in this state providing for the ex parte appointment of a
trustee to succeed a trustee named by will.O If the trustee originally named
in the trust instrument disclaims, there is, apparently, no need to join tho
disclaiming trustee in the equity proceeding for the appointment of a new
trustee." The theory upon which these last mentioned cases proceed is that,
althou~gh the trust is valid despite the disclaimer of the trustee, the dis-
claiming trustee gets no title to the trust property and so is not an indis-
pensable party to the proceedings.
If the instrument creating the trust was a deed or inter vivos trans-
action and if no provision was made therein for the appointment of a
8. Brandon v. Carter, 119 Mo. 572, 24 S. W. 1035 (1894); 1 Scorr, TRusTs
§ 108.2; 3 (1939), Part 1, BOGERT, TRusTs § 532 (1946). If suit is brought for the
purpose of removing a trustee from office, he must, of course be a party to that
proceeding and have notice thereof. Hitch v. Stonebreaker's Estate, 125 Mo. 128, at
140, 28 S. W. 443 (1894).
9. Hitch v. Stonebraker's Estate, 125 Mo. 128, at 139-140, 28 S.W. 443
(1894); Barnett v. Smart, 158 Mo. 167, 59 S. W. 235 (1900); Bredell v. Westminster
College, 242 Mo. 317, at 335, 147 S. W. 105 (1912); Rawlings v. Rawlings, 332
Mo. 503, at 508, 58 S.W. 2d 735 (1933); Morrow v. Morrow, 113 Mo. App. 444,
87 S. W. 590 (1905); Dillon v. Stevens, 62 Mo. App. 479 (1895); Compton v. Mc-
Mahan, 19 Mo. App. 494, at 510 (1885).
10. See the text discussion of the statutes providing for ex parte proceedings
to appoint successors to trustees named by deed, at notes 12 to 14 infra. 3, Part 1,
BOGERT, TRusTs § 533 (1946), contains a very condensed treatment of proceedings
for the appointment of successor trustees.
11. Brandon v. Carter, 119 Mo. 572, 24 S.W. 1035 (1894); Oxley Stave
Company v. Butler County, 121 Mo. 614, at 639 and 640, 26 S.W. 367 (1894).
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successor trustee or if such a provision has not been compiled with, § 3525,
Mo. REV. STAT. (1939) provides for the ex parte application by the
beneficiary to the circuit court of the county in which the trust property,
or any part thereof, is situated and § 3527, Mo. REV. STAT. (1939)12
provides for the appointment of a successor trustee by that court. Pro-
ceedings Under these statutes require no notice and are thus much easier
to prosecute than the personal, adversary, proceedings which are otherwise
necessary. It should be carefully noted that these two sections of the
statutes apply only to the case of a trust created by deed and have no
application to a trust which has 'been created by will.13 There are no
equivalent statutes which apply to the cases of trusts created by will so
that, in theory, the only manner in which proceedings for the appointment
of successor trustees of a trust created by will may be had will be by the
traditional in personam proceedings in which all interested parties must
be joined.14
12. Both of §§ 3525 and 3527, Mo. REV. STAT. (1939), combine proceedings
for the appointment of successor trustees in the cases of deeds of trust to secure
the payment of debts and in the cases of deeds of trust for the benefit or use of
any person. They are interesting examples of legislation by accession. In Mo. Laws
1849, p. 127, a one section statute appeared which applied only to deeds of trust to
secure debts and which combined the application, the appointment of successor
trustee, and the vesting of title in the successor trustee in that one section. The
statute next appeared in Mo. REv. STAT. (1855), in a two section form, §§ 1
and 2 of chapter 162, but it still applied only to deeds of trust for the payment of
debts, altho it was here broken into two sections, the first of which dealt with the
application for appointment of a successor and the second with his appointment
and the vesting of title in him. In Mo. Laws 1864, at p. 131, the statute again
appeared in a two section form but, for the first time, included deeds of trust for
the benefit or use of any person. The new material was added by way of tacking
appropriate language on to the old statute. The forms of these statutes have hanged
very little as they have appeared, with amendments, from time to time as: §§ 1
and 2, chap. 154, GEN. STAT. 1866; §§ land 2, chap. 139, Wagner's Mo. STAT.
(1872); §§ 3929 and 3930. Mo. REy. STAT. (1879); §§ 8683 and 8684, Mo. REV.
STAT. (1889); §§ 4580 and 4581, Mo. REV. STAT. (1899); §§ 11919 and 11920,
M6. REV. STAT. (1909); §§ 13418 and 13419, Mo. REV. STAT. (1919); §§ 3135 and
3137, Mo. REV. STAT. (1929). (Present § 3526, Mo. REV. STAT. (1939), which has
nothing whatever to do with either the preceding or following sections, was wedged
in between the two closely related sections by Mo. Laws 1921, p. 689, and continues
to divide the sections which had occupied adjoining positions, and numbers, from
1864 to 1921).
13. 'Hitch v. Stonebraker's Estate, 125 Mo. 128, at 138-140, 28 S.W. 443
(1894); Barnett V. Smart, 158 Mo. 167, at 175 and 181, 59 S.W. 235 (1900);
Brandon v. Carter, 119 Mo. 572, at 581, 24 S.W. 1035 (1894).
14. See, cases cited, supra note 9. There are cases such as Rothenberger v.
Garrett, 224 Mo. 191, 123 S.W. 574 (1909) and In re Parker's Trust Estate, 228
Mo. App. 400, 67 S.W. 2d 114 (1934), which impair the in personam theory
advanced in the text when they either directly say that an ex parte proceeding to
appoint a successor.to a testamentary trustee is authorized under Missouri law
(Parker) or say that a circuit court, as such, has the power to appoint new trustees
so that an ex parte proceeding in which a successor to a testamentary trustee was
4
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VESTING OF TITLE IN SUCCESSOR TRUSTEES
The naming, or providing for the appointment, of a successor trustee
is only a part of the problem involved in the drafting of a trust instrument
or that involved in the court appointment of a successor trustee. It is neces-
sary that title to the trust property be vested in the successor trustee, no
matter how he may be selected or appointed. If the draftsman of the trust
instrument, whether it be a deed or a will, provides for the vesting of title'
in the successor trustee by virtue of his appointment, such a provision is
valid and effective as a power of appointment.15 Provision should be made
for the appointment, if made by designated individuals, to be made by an
instrument in writing, to be acknowledged in such a manner as to entitle
it to be recorded in the office of the appropriate recorder of deeds in the
same manner as other instruments affecting real property.'8 This last re-
quirement is applicable primarily to trust instruments which deal with
real property and, it would seem, would have no application to trust in-
struments which dispose entirely of personalty, unless the trust instrument
authorizes the trustee to invest the trust estate in real property.
If the trust instrument does not provide for the vesting of the title
to the trust property in the successor trustee, it will be necessary, if the
successor trustee is appointed by the circuit court in an in personam pro-
ceeding, for the court either to order the original trustee, or his legal repre-
sentatives, to convey the trust property to the newly appointed trustee
appointed is not open to collateral attack (Rothenberger). The Parker case seems
to me to be wrongly decided on the point in issue. I think that the Rothenberger
case can be justified.
Throughout this article, and in dealing with the cases in this field, the reader
should bear in mind the varying meanings and uses of the terms "jurisdiction" and
'"power," as well as the proposition that any merely "erroneous" action taken by a
court which has "jurisdiction" of the subject-matter and parties is valid and bind-
ing until the judgment is directly attacked, but that any action which is taken
by a court which does not have "jurisdiction" is beyond its "power," is void and
subject to collateral attack. In those instances where action has been taken by a
court which has "jurisdiction," res judicata comes into play and must be considered.
I am not herein concerned so much with the question of whether or not our courts
have the "power" to act as I am with whether or not they should properly attempt
to exercise the "power," even though it may be conceded to exist in any given in-
stance.
15. Harwood v. Tracy, 118 Mo. 631, 24 S.W. 214 (1893); Adams v. Highland'
Cemetery Co., 192 S.W. 944 (Mo. 1917); 1 Scorr, TRusTs § 110 (1939).
16. Sections 3426-3428, Mo. REv. STAT. (1939), set forth the requirements
for, and effect of, recording. Bumgarner v. Cogswell, 49 Mo. 259 (1872), indicates
the error of failing to show the entire picture of proper selection and vesting of title.
17. If the original trustee, or his legal representative, has title, the traditional
equity mode of proceeding directed him to convey to the successor trustee. Otto
5
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or to provide, by its decree, that the title to the trust property shall vest
in the successor trustee.1 8 Equity practitioners will recall that one of the
handicaps of traditional equity procedure was the announced inability of
the court of equity to act directly upon the title to property so that, absent
a statute, all that the court could do would be to order the defendant to
convey. Under the traditional equity practice, until and unless the defendant
conveyed the property, title remained in him and was not transferred to
the newly appointed trustee. This situation led to the early passage of legis-
lation which gave to decrees of courts of equity ordering a conveyance the
effect of a conveyance in the event of non-compliance with the decree,
whether caused by defendant's obstinancy or his inability to convey.""
Sections 1255 and 1257, Mo. REV. STAT. (1939)20 are the Missouri
equivalents of the statutes referred to above and give an in rem operation
to the judgment of the court which directs or orders the holder of legal
v. Young, 227 Mo. 193, at 217, 127 S.W. 9 (1910). The remarks in Henderson v.
Dickey, 50 Mo. 161, at 165 (1872) to the effect that the old chancery practice
authorized the direct passage of title by force of the decree of the court are
obviously incorrect. See text, infra, at notes 18. and 19.
18. Under statutory provisions which give to the judgment of a court the
direct effect of a conveyance, the judgment may, by its terms, act as a conveyance
of the property. Macklin v. Allenberg, 100 Mo. 337, at 341, 13 S.W. 350 (1889);
Otto v. Young, supra n. 17. See infra note 19 and the following paragraph in he
text.
19. The early equity background and the origin and development of the
statutory enlargement of the power of equity courts so as to permit their decrees
directly to affect property involved in litigation are succinctly and accurately set
forth in Evans, Problems in the Enforcement of Federal Judgments, 4 Mo. LAW
REV. 19, at 19 to 29 (1939). There is no 'need to pad this article with these matters
when this excellent treatment is available. His resume and classification of the
types of statutory treatments of this subject are well worth reading.
20. Legislation of this type first appears in Mo. Terr. Laws 1816, p. 62, § 2,
which is reprinted as § 2 of Chap. 161, in 1 Mo. Terr. Laws, 1824. It is recast as
§§ 39 and 40 of an act regulating practice in chancery, in Mo. REV. STAT. (1925),
at p. 643. It has always seemed that §§ 1255 and 1257 provided alternative modes
of having the court's decree serve to vest title to the property. Section 1255 says
that the court may by its judgment pass title to the property. Section 1257 says
that if a party is ordered by a judgment to convey and does not comply with the
judgment, the judgment shall have the same effect as a conveyance. The only
difference between the two sections lies in the fact that, under § 1255, the judgment
will recite that it vests title, while, under § 1257, the judgment which in terms
orders a party to convey, if not complied with, then acts, with a sort of delayed
action, to convey the property. In Bryant v. Kyner, 204 S.W. 2d 284, at 288-290
(Mo. 1947) involving specific performance of contract, our supreme court stated
that § 1257 was for the benefit of vendees and that § 1255 was for the benefit of
vendors. What this pronouncement means is a mystery to me, excepting as to
the issue of whether or not a party may be jailed for contempt if he doesn't convey,
as ordfred by the .judgment. Both statutes seem to 'me to be for the benefit of
successful litigants who want, and should have, title or possession vested in them
if the defendant can't, or doesn't, convey or deliver.
[Vol. 13
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title to personalty or realty to convey that property so that what reads like
a judgment to convey will pass the title to the property whether or not the
defendant complies with the judgment.21 The sections of the statutes just
referred to are general in their operation and are found in the article of the
statutes which deals with Judgments. There is no. special section in our
statutes which deals specifically with the vesting of title to trust property
in successor trustees in the cases of testamentary trusts so that the vesting
of title in such successor trustees depends entirely upon a combination of
the common-law equity powers of the court and the statutes just mentioned
which give a direct effect to the order of the court directing title to be vested
in the successor trustee. It should be noted that, if the trfist property be
located within the state and if the trustee be absent from the state, it is
possible for proceedings to be instituted in which service may be hid upon
the absent trustee either by publication, service at his residence, or by
registered mail for the purpose of vesting title to such trust property in the
successor trustee. This is possible only -because, by virtue of the passage of
legislation such as was referred to above,22 the nature of such a proceeding
is no longer viewed as being of an in personam character, but is now to be
regarded as being the equivalent of an in rem proceeding which, because it
directly affects property within the state, may be based upon such service.
23
21. Section 1298, Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) provides that such a judgment, in
order to be valid as to parties other than the parties to the original suit or those
who have actual notice must be recorded in the county where the affected lands
lie within eight months after the entry thereof.
22. Evans, loc cit. supra note 19; supra, note 20.
23. Although I have not found any Missouri cases which directly pass upon
the power of our courts, acting under statutes of this type, to affect the title to trust
property which is situated within the state, in cases of the type mentioned in the text,
the general proposition that a Missouri court may so act, in cases of parallel types
is well illustrated by the case of State ex rel. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Sartorius,
350 Mo. 46, 164 S.W. 2d 356 (1942), in which the court, speaking of fi proceeding
based upon service by publication said, at p. 55: ". . .'the distinction sought to be
drawn is tenuous, regardless of the nature of the trustees' action, in which the non-
resident and unknown parties may be brought in under constructive notice by
publication, as here. As to those served only by publication and who do not appear,
it is essentially in the nature of, and should be classed with, actions in rem." Again,
on p. 57, the court said: "The subject matter, the trust property, was within thejurisdiction of the court, and the notice by publication to non-resident and unknown
defendants was adequate to warrant the court in decreeing who were entitled to
distributive shares; and such a decree protects the trustees." Other cases are:
State ex rel. Bensberg v. Hartmann, 323 Mo. 171, 19 S.W. 2d 637 (1929) (Suit to
trace and recover trust property); Shemwell v. Bettis, 264 Mo. 268, 174 S.W. 390
(1915) (Suit to quiet title); Mitchener v. Holmes, 117 Mo. 185, 22 S.W. 1070
(1893) (Suit to remove cloud on title); Adams v. Cowles, 95 Mo. 501, 8 S.W. 711,
6 Am. St. Rep. 74 (1888) (Suit to set aside conveyance as being in fraud of
creditors). If the court of a state, having a trustee who has title to lands or property
7
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If the instrument creating the trust was a deed or an inter vivos trans-
action and if no provision was made in the instrument for the appointment
of a successor trustee and the vesting of title in him or if such a power has
not been exercised, the beneficiary may, as has been noted,2 4 in an ex parte
proceeding, based upon statute, apply to the appropriate circuit court for the
appointment of a successor trustee. Section 3527, Mo. REV. STAT. (1939)
provides that the person so appointed by the circuit court shall, by virtue
of such appointment, be vested with the same powers, title and interest in
the trust property as were vested in the original trustee. It should be care-
fully noted that the operation of this statute is confined to trusts which
have been created by deed and that the statute has no application whatever
to trusts which have been created by will.25 It will thus be seen that § 3527,
in providing that title shall vest in the court-appointed successor trustee, is
a special kind of so-called in rem statute which has application only to
the cases of successor trustees who are appointed to fill vacancies in the
offices of trustees provided for in deeds or inter vivos transactions. The
existence of §§ 3525 and 3527 does not mean that they are to be used ex-
clusively in the cases of trusts created by deed. A suit may be brought to
remove a trustee named by deed or will, appoint his successor and vest title
to the trust property in that successor and the relief sought will be granted
in what is, in effect, an adversary in personam proceeding, with the general
in rem statutes serving to vest title in the newly appointed successor.
20, It
in a foreign state before it, attempts by its decree directly to transfer or affect the
title to those foreign lands or property, such a decree will be ineffective. De Lashmutt
v. Teetor, 261 Mo. 412, at 433-436, 169 S.W. 34 (1914). Such a decree can be valid
only as an order directed personally to the trustee.
24. Supra, at notes 12 and 13.
25. Hitch v. Stonebraker's Estate, 125 Mo. 128, at 138-139, 28 S.W. 443
(1894); Barnett v. Smart, 158 Mo. 167, at 175 and 181, 59 S.W. 235 (1900);
Brandon v. Carter, 119 Mo. 572, at 581, 24 S.W. 1035 (1894). The cases of
Rdthenberger v. Garrett and In re Parker's Trust Estate, mentioned supra, note
14, seem to sanction the ;x parte appointment of trustees named to succeed testa-
mentary trustees and the consequent vesting of title to the trust property in them.
In this respect these cases present instances of judicial innovations. No statutory
warrant exists for either type of action in this kind of instance.
26. Such a case was that of Watson v. Hardwick, 231 S.W. 964 (Mo. 1921)
(deed). For a clear statement in a will case, see Covey v. Pierce, 229 Mo. App.
424, at 436; 82 S.W. 2d 592 (1935). See the cases cited, supra, note 9. The early
proceedings in the case of State ex rel. McManus v. Muench, 217 Mo. 124, at
130-131, 117 S.W. 25, 129 Am. St. Rep. 536 (1909), present a perfect picture of
how to proceed in an in personam proceeding to appoint a trustee to succeed a
testamentary trustee who had died and to vest title in that successor. All bene-
ficiaries and the heirs at law of the deceased trustee were joined and the judgment,
after appointing a successor, recited that the title of the deceased trustee be
divested out of his heirs at law and vested in the newly appointed trustee. The
lawyers in this case knew precisely what they were doing and how to get it done.
[Vol. 13
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has been noted above that there is no such special statutory provision made
for the vesting of title in successor trustees who are appointed to fill vacancies
in the offices of trustees provided for in wills or testamentary instrument.27
COURT SUPERVISION OF TRUST ADMINISTRATION
As late as 1934, the Saint Louis Court of Appeals announced that:
"Under the common law, courts of equity had the inherent
right and power to exercise jurisdiction over trust estates, which,
of course, carried with it the right to appoint trustees, take and
approve bonds, supervise the administration of the trust estate by
tle trustee and to make all orders necessary for the preservation and
conservation of the trust property for the use and benefit of the
beneficiaries. (Italics supplied)
"This jurisdiction has been recognized and aptly referred to by
many of our courts as an ancient head of equity jurisdiction."
(Citing Brandon v. Carter and State ex rel. v. Muencl. )28
27. Supra, at note 16 and note 25. The cases of Rothenberger v. Garrett and
In re Parker's Trust Estate, mentioned supra, notes 14 and 25, seem to confuse
the power of our courts, proceeding in an ex parte manner under specific enabling
legislation, such as §§ 3525 and 3527, Mo. REV. STAT. (1939), which permits ap-
pointment and vesting of title in trustees named to succeed trustees who were
named in a deed, to vest title to the trust property in the successor trustee, with
the power of a court exercising the powers of a court of equity and proceeding
in a suit to which the ex-trustee is a party and in which he has been served with
process or notice, to vest title to the trust property in such a successor trustee
under the provision of our so-called general "in rem" statutes, mentioned swpra
notes 20-23. The first of the just mentioned instances of appointment and vesting
is based upon valid statutory provisions relating only to trusts created by deed
and the second is based upon a valid proceeding in which notice has been given
and to which the in rem statutes give the effect of a conveyance. Neither of these
situations should be confused with a case in which a court attempts to proceed in
an ex parte manner to appoint and vest title in a trustee who is to fill a vacancy
in a testamentary trust, because there is no warrant to proceed in such a manner
without a statute and we have no statute authorizing ex parte proceedings to make
appointments of, and vest title in, successor trustees under testamentary trusts.
In Hitch v. Stonebraker's Estate, 125 Mo. 128, 28 S.W. 443 (1894) the court said,
at page 139: "It is within the power of no court to take property rights from one
citizen, and transfer them to another, unlesi it has acquired jurisdiction, either of
the person or the property." The quoted language seems to me completely to
refute the cases mentioned earlier in this note. I have no objection to ex parte
proceedings in cases of the appointment of successor trustees in testamentary
trusts, but I do believe that express legislation is needed to confer that power on
our courts.
28. State ex rel. Kenney v. Johnson, 229 Mo. App. 16, at 21, 68 S.W. 2d
858 (1934). What is to be said, herein, about court supervision of trust adminis-
tration has no application to the instance of a trustee whose trust estate is insolvent
or one who, as the equivalent of a receiver, is either required or is appointed
to manage or liquidate an insolvent business, as in the case of Seigle v. First
National Bank, 338 Mo. 417, 90 S.W. 2d 776 (1936). In these instances the juris-
diction of equity exists on the basis of its power to administer the estates of
involvents. GLENN, THE LAw GOVERNING LIQUIATION, §§ 2-4, 72, 148, 151, 153
(1935). In the case of the trustee whose trust estate is insolvent, that trust estate
may properly be brought into court for the purpose of administration.
9
Overstreet: Overstreet: Appointment of Successor Trustees
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1948
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
Statements such as the one quoted above to the effect that courts
exercising equity powers have power to supervise the administration of
trusts as one of the ancient heads of chancery jurisdiction are frequently
made, but such statements do not, apparently, accurately describe the law
in Missouri. .
In State ex rel. McManus v. MUench,29 the Supreme Court of Missouri
held squarely that the circuit court of the city of St. Louis which had ap-
pointed a successor trustee to fill the vacancy in a testamentary trust .of
lands in St. Louis and had provided in its decree that the case be retained
in respect to the successor trustee's administration of the trust had no power
so to retain the case for the purpose of administering the trust under the
supervision of the court. Judge Lamm, in delivering the opinion of the court
en banc clearly stated that,
"Conceding that trusts and their administration are an ancient
head of equity jurisdiction, yet in Missouri jurisdiction of the sub-
ject-matter of a concrete case in equity or 'law is only acquired
by a court through pleadings filed, process issued or appearance
entered, and decrees entered within the lines of the issues framed
by pleadings."30
The opinion of the court further stated that the power of the trial court
had been exhausted by the appointment of a new trustee, making provision
for the bond and investing him with title, saying,
"This certainly is so unless we adopt the heresy that a court, s;a
sponte may hold a trust estate in its grasp for all purposes of admin-
istration under some droll notion that once in chancery for any pur-
pose whatsoever a trust estate is always in chancery for all purposes
whatsoever."'.
Judge Lamm pointed squarely at another reason underlying the proposi-
tion that a court will not undertake to supervise the administration of a
trust when he said,
"But, in this connection, it must also be remembered that the
grandmother's will, ex vi termini, contemplated that a person, not
a court, should manage the trust. The finger can be put on nothing
in that will even squinting at a wish on the grandmother's part
that the execution of the trust raised should be subjected to the
traditional delays and expenses of an administration in a court of
chancery. '3 2
29. 217 Mo. 124, 117 S.W. 25, 129 Am. St. Rep. 536 (1909).
30. Id. at 137.
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Despite these clear statements, cases occasionally appeared in the
books in which trustees named in trust instruments were appointed, as
trustees, by trial courts or in which the courts attempted to retain cases
involving trusts for the purpose of supervising the trustee's administration
of the trust.33 In Riggs v. Moise34 the court quoted with approval from the
Muenchk case and again stated that courts of equity in this state have no
power generally to supervise the administration of a trust, save as they
are brought into action by the proper institution of an action by either the
trustee or the beneficiary for the purpose of settling a dispute as to a
specific matter.
It is necessary to qualify the statement made above so as to take note
of the statute which was passed in 1911,35 and which now appears as
§ 3537, Mo. REV. STAT. (1939), providing that if the circuit court of the
county in which a will disposing of an estate has been proved or recorded
shall appoint a successor trustee for that estate, that court shall have juris-
diction of the trustee, trust estate and beneficiaries as to all matters. relating
to the administration of the trust, may act upon its own motion or upon
notice and motion by any person interested in the trust and may require
the appointed successor testamentary trustee to file accounts. Inasmuch as
State ex rel. McManus v. Muenck3 8 was decided in 1909, it would seem that
the statute just referred to was passed to avoid the result of that case.
Whether or not that was the purpose of the act of 1911, it is apparent that
it had that effect when one reads the case of McManus v Park37 which held
that the act of 1911 properly applied to permit the court which had ap-
pointed the successor trustee of the same testamentary trust estate which
had been involved in the Menct case to require the filing of accounts by
the trustee, under the provisions of § 2 of the Act of 1911.38 As a result of
33. State ex rel. Kenney v. Johnson, 229 Mo. App. 16, 68 S.W. 2d 858 (1934);State ex rel. Heddens v. Rusk, 236 Mo. 201, 139 S.W. 199 (1911); In-re Beauchamp's
Estate, 184 S.W. 2d 729 (Mo. App. 1945).
34. 344 Mo. 177, 128 S.W. 2d 632 (1939). The attempted judicial appointment
of the trustee named in the will by the circuit court, of course, made all subsequent
proceedings void.
35. Mo. Laws 1911, p. 430, quoted, infra, in text at note 62.36. 217 Mo. 124, 117 S.W. 25, 129 Am. St. Rep. 536 (1909), supra, notes
29-32.
37. 287 Mo. 109, 229 S.W. 211 (1921), in which, on the point of the purpose
of the act and with reference to the Muench case, the court said, on p. 119:
"It is evident that the act of 1911 was intended to remedy that defect; that is,
to give the circuit court jurisdiction over trustees which the ruling of this court in
that case held it did not possess."
38. Mo. Laws 1911, § 2, p. 431, now § 3538, Mo. REv. STAT.-(1939).
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these cases and the statute in question, it will be seen that, after the act
of 1911, the court of the county in which a-will creating a trust estate
has been filed.or recorded which has appointed a trustee to fill a vacancy
in a testamentary trust has been granted the specific power by that act to
supervise the administration of the trust. No such specific power has ever
been granted in the case of trusts which have been created by deed,
whether the original trustee or a successor is acting as trustee, so that there
seems to be no such power in a court of this state in the case of such a trust.
Although the direct holding in the Park case dealt only with the power
of the court to require accountings, it would seem that the holding also should
apply to the requirement set forth in the act of 1911 as to supervision of
administration of the trust.
It should also be carefully noted that § 3537 applies only to successor
trustees who have been appointed by a designated circuit court to fill a
vacancy in a testamentary trust. The statute would seem to have no appli-
cation to the case of an original trustee who has been named as trustee in a
will. The conclusion that this staute was passed to take care of the exact
situation presented by the Muenchk case seems to be inescapable when one
realizes that the facts of the Muenck case are the exact facts set forth in the
statute.8 9
To repeat, it seems that prior to the act of 191140 there was-no power
in any court in the state of Missouri generally to retain a trust case so as
to supervise the administration of the trust or to compel the filing of periodic
reports. The act of 1911 confers such a power only upon the court which
has appointed a successor trustee to fill a vacancy in a testamentary trust
created by a will which has been proved or recorded in the county in which
the court sits. As to all other trusts and trustees, the situation existing
before the passage of the act of 1911, as announced in the Mvench case,
is still in effect today. If legislation was required to remedy the situation
presented by the Muenck case and if that legislation applied only to cases
with the same essential facts as those in the Muenck case, then all trusts
other than those of the exact type as in that case are in the same state
as they were prior to 1911.
39. See the excerpt from the Park case quoted supra note 37 and, also, note
how the jurisdictional requirements set forth in § 1 of the act of 1911 are the exact
facts which were present in the Muench case. The facts of that case are condensed in
the text, supra, at note 29.
40. Supra, at notes 29-34.
[Vol. 13
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Suppose that a testator or settlor provides in the trust instrument that.
"In the administration of this trust, my trustee shall be subject to supervision
by the Circuit Court of X County, Missouri," and that in a suit based upon
personal service upon the trustee, the beneficiaries request that the Circuit
Court of X County, Missouri, undertake to supervise the administration of
the trust. If one takes the language of Judge Lamm in the Muenck case41
literally it would seem that the circuit court has no jurisdiction to supervise
administration of the trust and that jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon
a court by either a seitlor or litigants. If, however, Judge Lamm's lan-
guage42 be read as saying that "because the will in the Muenc, case didn't
contemplate court supervision of the administration of the trust and because
court supervision of the trust was not specifically requested in the pleadings,
the court, for these reasons, had no jurisdiction to retain that case, in that
form, to superxqise administration," 43 then one might say that in the case
supposed above, the court would have jurisdiction to grant the requested
relief. At the time of this writing, my guess is that the court could not
grant such relief.
The guess just made above is opposed by formidable authority. The
case of Ross v. Pitcairn4 4 involved the question of whether the action had
been instituted by the proper party plaintiff, and this depended upon
whether or not a probate court had properly acted in summarily withdraw-
ing, or revoking, previously granted letters of administration. If the probate
court had acted improperly, the plaintiff's later appointment as administrator
de bonis non was invalid so that he could not be the proper party plaintiff
in this action which was brought under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act for the death of his decedent. In addition to deciding that the plaintiff
did not have the capacity to maintain the action because of the invalidity
of the action of the probate court in summarily revoking the letters, the
opinion of Division One of the Missouri Supreme Court, by way of obiter
dictum, advanced the following explanation of Riggs v. Moise,45 State ex rel.
McManus v. Muenh,46 and McManus v. Parks:4 7
41. Supra, at notes 30 and 31.
42. Supra, at notes 30 and 32.
43. See the text infra, next paragraph.
44, 179 S.W. 2d 35 (Mo. 1944).
45. Supra, note 34.
46. Supra, note 29.
47. Supra, note 37.
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"It may be considered that there is a distinction between the power
of a circuit court when acting as 'a court of equity in adjudicating
issues involved in the administration of a trust wherein it is not
contemplated that the court shall direct or supervise the adminis-
tration of the trust (the jurisdiction of the corpus of the trust not
being in the court for administration), and the powers of a court of
equity in directing the administration of the trust where the corpus
of the trust estate has been brought into the court for the purpose
of administration. In those trusts wherein it is not contemplated by
the instrument of trust or by statute that the court shall direct the
administration of the trust, the court cannot act; except upon issues
which are presented by the parties in their pleadings. A trust of
the latter class was involved in State ex rel. McManus v. Muench,
supra (a case 'decided prior to the enactment of Section 3537,
R.S. 1939, Mo R.S.A. §3537, and see McManus v. Park, 287 Mo.
109, 229 S.W. 211), for the court said, 217 Mo. at page 140, 117 S.W.
at page 30, 129 Am. St. Rep. 536, 'But in this connection, it must
also be remembered that the grandmother's will, ex vi termini,
contemplated that a person, not a court, should manage the trust';
...Ought a court hold that a court of equity, if vested with the
jurisdiction of the supervision of the administration of a particular
trust, has not the inherent power to remove, and cannot ex mero
motu, upon due notice and opportunity to be heard, remove a trus-
tee for good cause? We will not 'discuss this question further
here." 48
The statement quoted above advances the following theories: (1) that
a settlor, by direction in the trust instrument, may confer jurisdiction upon
a circuit court to direct or supervise the administration of a trust; (2) that
the corpus of any trust estate may be brought into a circuit court for adminis-
tration; (3) that if the trust instrument, or a statute, does not contemplate
court supervision of the trust's administration, the court can only act upon
issues presented by the pleadings, with the strong inference that, with ap-
propriate pleadings, the court can supervise the trust's administration (cit-
ing the Mwencl and Park cases on this point). If the second theory, above,
be true, why in the world is there any need for the third theory? If, as the
second theory states, the corpus of any trust estate may be brought into
a circuit court for administration, why then add, as theory (3), that the
parties may, by their pleadings,'present a case where the court will direct
the administration of the trust? The court's statement about the statute
which confers jurisdiction upon a circuit court to supervise administration
48. 179 S.W. 2d 35, at 37 (Mo. 1944).
[Vol. 13
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is quite correct, but the only statute in this state which does that is § 3537,
which has only a limited application. 49 All of the three theories seem to me
to be opposed to the holding in the Muenck case, unless one places a re-
verse twist upon the statements of Judge Lamm in that case, as mentioned
above50 and as was done in this dictum in Ross v. Pitcairn."' It may also be
argued that, inasmuch as the legislature passed § 3537 in order to provide
for court supervision of administration only in the cases of the type of trus-
tees mentioned in that statute, it was the legislative intention not to permit
court supervision of administration in the cases of any other type of trustee
not covered by that statute. That possibility is not even mentioned, or
apparently considered, in the quoted dictum from Ross v. Pitcairn. At the
present time, the case and statute law in Missouri seem to me to establish
that there is no power in a circuit court of this state to supervise a direct
administration of a trust estate, save and only in the specific instance pre-
sented by § 3537. If it is felt that this condition needs correction, let that
come either by way of legislation, which may take the form of either requir-
ing, or permitting, such supervision, or of a forthright repudiation by our
supreme court of the Muenck case and its implications. 52
a The basic idea of the trustee's being the one who is to manage and
control the trust property, exercising his discretion in so doing, is apparently
attempted to be counteracted, in this instance, because of the desire of the
trustee to be protected in his management of the trust estate through orders
and directions of a court, given in advance of action by the trustee. The
settlor, apparently, wanted the trustee to manage the trust estate. Although
a court will not take upon itself the administration of the trust, 5 a trustee
49. See text, supra, at notes 35-40.
50. See text, supra, at notes 41-48. See, also, State ex rel. Ponath v. Muench,
230 Mo. 236, 130 S.W. 282 (1910).
51. See quotation in text, supra, at note 48.
52. See, infra, note 53.
53. For those who are interested in the actual situation in this country as to
the attitudes of courts, and states, toward judicial supervision of the administration
of trust estates, I highly recommend, as required reading, the comment: Trusts-
Judicial Supervision of the Administration of Trusots, 35 MicH. L. REv. 479 (1937).
It is there pointed out that only Maryland recognizes the common law power of
equity courts to supervise trust administration. If the courts of this state want to
assert such a common law power, this comment and the Maryland cases will
indicate the path to be followed. In states other than Maryland, only infrequently,
and in special cases, is the common law power asserted. Elsewhere, including
Missouri, the matter is regulated by statutes, which vary greatly in their contents.
The reader is again reminded that those trust, or other, estates which have been
brought into equity for administration upon the ground that their insolvency requires
administration, are properly in equity for administration and that these remarks
have no application to those situations, as was mentioned, supra, in note 28.
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who is in honest doubt as to a real question may file a bill for instructions,"
or may proceed under the Declaratory Judgment Act.?5 In other instances
it may well be true that the trustee should exercise his best judgment in
the administration of the- trust, rather than to incur expense and spend time
in getting prior court approval of details of administration when the only
object of such prior court approval is to protect, or insulate, the trustee
from any liability which might otherwise result from his proposed action.
Maybe we should think of the beneficiary and the trust estate as well as of
the trustee and his protection. Whatever we may think of the present situa-
tion, it seems that the enactment of carefully considered and appropriate
legislation is the proper way to work a change.
FILING OF REPORTS AND SETTLEMENTS
Trustees, whether appointed by will or deed and whether original or
successor trustees, may, and should, present settlements of their accounts
to the beneficiaries. Such voluntary settlements, if fair and accurate, should
be binding upon both the trustee and beneficiary. If a trustee does not so
present settlements of his accounts to the beneficiary, the beneficiaries may
demand and compel an accounting by adversary proceedings brought for
that purpose.58 If a dispute arises between the trustee and beneficiary as
to whether the trustee's settlement of accounts is proper, the trustee may
institute proceedings in which his accounts will be examined by the court. 7
Professor Bogert, in discussing the then proposed Uniform Trustees'
Accounting Act,58 pointed out that in this country requirements as to
accounting by trustees vary, as follows: 9 (1) some states neither require
periodic accountings nor confer jurisdiction on any court to demand or
54. State ex rel. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Sartorius, 350 Mo. 46, 164
S.W. 2d 356 (1942); Hayden's Executors v. Mirmaduke, 19 Mo. 403 (1854). See,
also, the excellent and exhaustive treatment and citation of cases in Comment:
Executors' and Trustee? Bills for Instructions, 44 YALE L. J. 1433 (1935); 3 Part
1, BOGERT, TRUSTS, § 559 (1946); 2 Scorr, TRUSTS, § 259 (1939).
55. Sections 1126-1140, Mo. REv. STAT. (1939). Section 1129 is particularly
in point.
56: Price v. Boyle, 287 Mo. 257, at 270, 229 S.W. 206 (1921); Bobb v. Bobb,
89 Mo. 411, at 423, 4 S.W. 511 (1887); Boden v. Johnson, 226 Mo. App. 787, 47
S.W. 2d 155 (1932). The judgment approving an account made in an adversary
proceeding is res adjudicata. Peake v. Jamison, 82 Mo. 552 (1884).
57. Johnson v. Grice, 272 Mo. 423, 199 S.W. 409 (1917); 4 BOGERT, TRUSTS,
§ 969 (1946); 2 ScorT, TRUSTS, § 260 (1939).
58. 9 U.L.A. 700 (1942).
59. Bogert, Te Proposed Uniforn Trustees' Accounting Act, 21 CORN. L. Q.
529 (1936). A digest of this article appears as the Commissioners' Prefatory Note
to the Act in 9 U.L.A. 697 (1942).
[Vol. 13
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receive accounts (this is, in effect, the traditional English chancery practice);
(2) some states permit a voluntary or compulsory accounting to be had in
a named court, but do not require it, or prescribe its form; (3) some states
require periodic accountings but do not prescribe the form of the account;
and (4) other, states (the older, more populous and wealthy ones) require
periodic accountings and prescribe the form and contents of the accounts
and procedure to be followed by the court in their examination and approval.
There is, apparently, no provision made in the statutory or case law of
Missouri for the filing of periodic ettlements by the trustee in a court
except in the one instance of the successor to a testamentary trustee who
has been appointed by the appropriate circuit court in this state to fill a
vacancy in the office of trustee. If what was said by the court in the Muench
case 0 as to the necessity for adversary proceedings to be instituted in order
that a circuit court in Missouri may have jurisdiction over any given aspect
of trust administration be taken as the law, the only effective judicial
accountings and settlements that can be had by trustees in this state are
those which may be had in proceedings yvhich are adversary in nature,
excepting the cases of those successor trustees who have been appointed
to fill vacancies in the cases of testamentary trusts.
When one reads § 3538, Mo. REv. STAT. (1939), which apprears in
Chapter 25 of the Revised Statutes, entitled "Trusts and Trustees," he sees,
"Every such trustee, appointed as in this chapter described,'shall
present to the court, wherein the appointment was made, a report
of the condition of said trust estate at least once each year and at
such other times when ordered by the court so to do." (Italics
supplied)
Inasmuch as this section appears in the same chapter of the statutes
as § 3527,1 which deals with the appointment of successor trustees who are
to fill vacancies existing in a trust created by deed, and § 3532, which
deals with the appointment of successor trustees to fill vacancies caused
by failure to give bond as required by statute, a reading of § 3538 would
lead one to believe that it applied to trustees appointed to fill vacancies
in trusts created by deed and to trustees appointed to fill vacancies
caused by failure to give bond. When the legislative history of § 3538 is
examined, however, the conclusion just mentioned appears to be wrong.
60. State ex rel. McManus v. Muench, 217 Mo. 124, 117 S.W. 25, 129 Am.
St. Rep. _36 (1909), cited and quoted in text, supra, at note 30.
61. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939), cited in text, supra, at note 12.
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The section which is now § 3538 was enacted in 1911 as § 2 of an act which
contained what is presently § 3537 as § 1. As enacted, the entire act read
as follows:
"Section 1. Court to have jurisdiction, when.-If the circuit
court of the county, in which a will disposing of an estate has been
proved or recorded, shall for such estate appoint a trustee to succeed
another therein, who has become disqualified to act, resigned or
died, then that court in the proceedings wherein the appointment
was made, shall have jurisdiction 'over such trustee, trust estate
and the beneficiaries thereof as to all matters relating to the
administration of said trust until terminated; and said court on
its own motion, or upon notice and motion by the trustee or any
beneficiary thereof, may in its discretion make orders therein neces-
sary to conserve the estate or to cause the same to be properly
administered.
"Section 2. Trustee to make annual reports.-Every such
trustee, appointed as in this act described, shall present to the court,
wherein appointment was made, a report of the condition of said
estate at least once each year and at such other times when ordered
by the court so to do. [Italics supplied]
"Section 3. Purpose of act.-For purposes of this act, the city
of St. Louis shall be considered a county."' 2
Section 2 of the act quoted above refers to trustees appointed as in "this
act" described. Section 1 refers only to successor trustees who have been
appointed by a circuit court of a county in which a will creating a trust
estate has been proved or recorded, to fill a vacancy in a testamentiry
trust, so that the requirement of Section 2 as to the filing of annual reports
by "every such trustee" had no application, at the time of the enactment
of that section, to any trustee other than the kind of trustee mentioned in
§ 1 of the act. Without ever having been the subject of a revision bill, or
other change by legislative enactment, the word "act" as it appeared in
§ 2 of the statute quoted above was apparently changed to the word
"chapter" by the revision commission when the revision of 1919 was pre-
pared. In that revision, this section appears as § 134303 and contains the
word "chapter" instead of the word "act." The section appeared in the same
form in the 1929 revision.64 It is a fundamental principle in this state that
62. Mo. Laws, 1911, page 430. The act is quoted in the form set forth above
in the case of McManus v. Park, 287 Mo. 109, at 121, 229 S.W. 211 (1921), cited,
supra, at note 37.
63. Section 13430, Mo. REv. STAT. (1919).
64. Section 3148, Mo. REv. STAT. (1929).
[Vol. 13
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a legislative act is always to be construed in its setting as it was enacted by
the legislature. 65 The act of the 1919 revision commission, in changing
the word "act" as it appeared in § 2 of the act of 1911 to the word "chapter"
as it appeared in the revision of 1919, and the acts of the subsequent revision
commission in 1929 and 1939 in continuing the change, without any legis-
lative sanction therefor, was an attempt to "change, modify or alter the
law,"66 and was not a compliance with the legislative mandate to have the
Revised Statutes contain ". . . laws of a general nature which were in force
at the commencement of this session .. . and continue in force by their own
provisions .... ,,1117 That change of words completely changed and broadened
the meaning of that section so as to include within its scope trustees who
might be appointed in ways other than that specified in section 1 of the
1911 act. The revision commission had no power to make such a change
and the section must, therefore, be read, today, as it was originally enacted
and has continued, without legislative change. This being true, since present
§ 3537, when enacted in 1911, as § 1 of an act which dealt only with trus-
tees who had been appointed to fill a vacancy in a testamentary trust, had
application only to trustees of that type, it would seem that present § 3538,
when enacted as § 2 of the act of 1911, dealt only with trustees who were
appointed by a court to administer trusts created by will and has no appli-
cation whatever to trustees who have been named in a will or deed or who
have been appointed by a court either to fill vacancies in trusts which have
been created by deed under the terms of § 3527 or to fill vacancies caused
by the failure of a prior trustee to give bond, asset forth in § 3532.
If the above conclusion be correct, it would seem that corrective legisla-
tion must be passed if trustees other than those appointed by a court to
fill vacancies in testamentary trusts are to be required or permitted to 'file
annual or other settlements. Here, too, it may be said that, inasmuch as
the legislature passed § 3538 in order to provide for the periodic and other
filing of reports only by the trustees mentioned in § 3537, it was the legis-
65. Pierce City v. Hentschel, 210 S.W. 31, at 32 (Mo. 1919); Timson v.
Manufacturers' Coal and Coke Co., 220 Mo. 580, at 590-592, 119 S.W. 565
(1909); § 7082, Mo. REv. STAT. (1919) (currently found as § 678, Mo. REV. STAT.
(1939)); § 7087, Mo. REV. STAT. (1919) (currently found as § 683, Mo. REv. STAT.
(1939)); §7089, Mo. REv. STAT. (1919) (currently found as § 685, Mo. REv. STAT.
(1939)), which, after authorizing the revision commission to change certain words
and typographical errors, ends with the following words: "... so that they do not
in any case change, modify or alter the law."
66. Section 7089, Mo. REv. STAT. (1919), quoted in part, supra, note 65.
67. Section 7082, Mo. REv. STAT. (1919).
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lative intention not to permit or require the filing of such periodic and other
reports in our courts by any other type of trustee.
Some of the confusion in this field may be due to the fact that executois
and administrators must qualify and have letters testamentary issued to
them by the probate court before they can act officially, at least with respect
to personalty in the decedent's estate. Such personal representatives are also
required to file periodic settlements.68 Extensive direction and supervision
by the probate court is necessary. Executors and administrators, like
trustees, are regarded as fiduciaries and a failure to comprehend that the
powers, functions and duties of the two types of fiduciaries are separate
and distinct may cause the unwary to believe that the same considerations
as to administration and accounting, should govern the conduct of both
types of fiduciaries.6 1
In many counties in the state of Missouri, it is the practice of trustees
who have been named as such in wills and deeds and who have not been
appointed by a court, to file annual and final settlements of their accounts
in the circuit courts of their counties. These matters are carried on the
docket under the heading of "Trust Estates." In some of these counties,
notice of the filing of such accounts and a copy of the account are given
to the beneficiaries, while in other counties no such notice is given.. It
would seem that the situation of those trustees who give notice of the filing
of the account and a copy of the account to the beneficiaries is better than
that of the trustees who do not give notice of the filing and a copy of the
account to the beneficiaries. If the circuit courts of this state have no power
to receive and pass upon settlements of accounts in the absence of adver-
sary proceedings, it would seem that a procedure such as has just been
mentioned would be little better than a private settlement of accounts
as between the trustee and beneficiary70 If, on the other hand a circuit
68. Sections 212-234, being art. 8, Chap. I, Mo. REv. STAT. (1939).
69. In In re Parker's Trust Estate, 228 Mo. App. 400, 67 S.W. 2d 114 (1934),
the Kansas City Court of Appeals mentioned that summary accounting procedures
were authorized solely by statute to be followed by probate courts in the cases of
executors and administrators but then said, at page 409: "Such statutes authorize
such proceedings in the probate court alone and furnish no authority whatever for
their exercise by the circuit court in the matter of trustees or trust estates and
their settlements." Ross v. Pitcairn, 179 S.W. 2d 35 (Mo. 1944), cited, suapra, at
notes 44 and 48, is another example of this confusion. Where one person is designated
as both executor and trustee, there may be nice questions as to when he ceases to
be executor and becomes trustee, as in State ex rel. Bremer v. Schulte, 90 S.W.
2d 1078 (Mo. App. 1936).
70. See text, supra, at notes 60-67.
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court in this state has jurisdiction in such matters, or if jurisdiction may
be conferred by the parties without there being adversary proceedings, such
settlements, when approved by the court, may be held to be binding.71 There
are circuit courts in this state which refuse to permit the filing of settle-
ments as mentioned in this paragraph, on the ground that they have no
power to entertain such proceedings. I heartily agree with this last type
of court.
If a settlor provides in the instrument which creates the trust that,
"My trustee shall file annual reports with the circuit court of X County,
Missouri," we have a variation of the problem discussed in connection with
a similar provision stating that a circuit court should have power to super-
vise the a~dministration of a trust and the same considerations would seem
to apply to the situation just supposed.72
It may be that a settlor will provide in the trust instrument that, "My
trustee shall prepare settlements annually and at the termination of his
trust, and shall serve copies of such settlement upon each of the beneficiaries
of this trust, from time to time, and such settlements so served upon the
beneficiaries shall be conclusive if no objections are taken thereto within
sixty days from the service thereof upon said beneficiaries." Such a provision
as the one just quoted is but another attempt to give finality to private
settlements as between the trustee and beneficiary. It would seem that, if the
settlements prepared by the trustee are fair and accurate, the failure of the
beneficiary to object thereto within the time limited should be binding
upon him. If, on the other hand, an unfair or inaccurate settlement is
served upon the beneficiary who cannot tell from the face of the settlement
that it is incorrect, it would seem that the beneficiary should not be con-
cluded from attacking such a settlement after the expiration of the stipu-
lated time, providing only that he acts within the time named in the
appropriate statute of limitation.
It is, indeed, unfortunate that so much uncertainty exists in this
state with respect to the rights and duties of the trustee and beneficiary
71. I suppose that an argument for upholding such a result would be based
upon ideas similar to those expressed in Ross v. Pitcairn, 179 S.W. 2d 35, at 37
(1944), which were discussed in the text, supra, at notes 42-52, in connection with
court supervision of trust administration.
72. See text, swpra, at notes 42-52. 4 BOGERT, TRusTs, § 972 (1946) discusses
the ability of the settlor to control the duty to account and to require the trustee
to file an account with a court. As to the last possibility, Bogert says that the court
could receive and file the account, if it were willing.
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as to the necessity for filing periodic and annual settlements, judicial ap-
proval thereof, the type of proceeding and the effect of such approval.
Some states, such as Michigan, require testamentary and other trus-
tees who are appointed by or under the jurisdiction of the probate 'court
to give bond and otherwise qualify before entering upon the execution of
the trust.7 3 The Michigan Probate Code is specific in its requirement that
trustees of the type just mentioned shall file periodic accounts of their
treatment of the trust estate74 and provides for judicial settlement of
such accounts.75
'It would seem that legislation should be enacted in this state for the
purpose of making it clear that all trustees should either be required or per-
mitted to file periodic settlements of their accounts in a court which is
empowered and directed to examine, approve or disapprovethose accounts.
It would seem that such legislation should also prescribe the form of such
accounts and the details thereof in such a manner that both the trustee
and beneficiary may Have the protection afforded by judicial settlement
of properly prepared accounts. Whether this legislation should take the
form of the Uniform Trustees' Accounting Act,7 6 or of the Michigan or
Kansas Probate Codes, 77 or of some variation between the two, is a matter
which should be considered by our General Assembly.
There is no reason why a state with the wealth and population of Mis-
souri should wait any longer to adopt needed legislation which will clarify
the problems which are presented in this discussion. Whether or not this
effort sheds enough light on the problems mentioned to make their solutions
crystal-clear is, to me, relatively unimportant if only it generates enough
heat to provide the energy necessary to produce the definitive legislation
in this field which is so sorely needed in this state' for the guidance of our
courts, our trustees and our trust beneficiaries.
78
73. Mich. Probate Code, Pub. Acts, 1939, No. 288, Ch. IV, §§ 1-3. Kansas
operates in the same fashion. Kansas Probate Code, Art. 17, Kansas Laws (1939),
Ch. 180, p. 327. There are other states which have modernized their systems. These
are given only as examples.
74. Mich. Probate Code, Pub. Acts, 1939, No. 288, Ch. IV, §§ 38-39.
75. Mich. Probate Code, Pub. Acts, 1939, No. 288, Ch. IV, §§ 44-47.
76. Supra, note 58.
77. "S-apra, notes 73-75.
78. It will be noted that in the last sentence, as is sometime the case after
the trust has been established, the beneficiaries come last.
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